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It Is Just Unfair Using Trade Laws to “Out” Security 
Software Vulnerabilities 
Marian K. Riedy* & Bartlomiej Hanus** 
In 2015, hackers gained access to hundreds of millions of consumer 
data records housed in the databases and systems of American 
businesses, and the number of records stolen climbed even higher the 
following year.  Though businesses spend billions of dollars each year on 
security software and systems to protect data from unauthorized 
disclosure, those systems often fail because of vulnerabilities in the 
software that hackers exploit.  All but the simplest software contains some 
vulnerabilities, including coding errors.  Pursuant to the observations of 
previous legal scholarship, one of the reasons “bad code” (i.e., code 
vulnerable to hacking) persists in the consumer market is that software 
vendors insulate themselves from accountability using contractual 
disclaimers of warranties and limitations on liability.  One might expect, 
by way of contrast, that in the commercial market for software and, in 
particular, for security software, companies would demand that the 
vendor share responsibility in the event of a data breach.  But this 
Article’s empirical analysis of end-user license agreements (i.e., 
agreements between the software vendor or developer and the software 
user) for such security products demonstrates a similar liability shield in 
the contractual terms.  Therefore, companies cannot, or perhaps just will 
not, hold security software vendors accountable.  The result is an 
unacceptable risk to consumers; therefore, this Article proposes that 
regulators should reduce the risk by using unfair trade laws.  Specifically, 
this Article recommends that if a security software vendor knows of a 
vulnerability in its code and fails to notify its licensees of that 
vulnerability, it should be charged with committing an unfair trade 
practice. 
 
 
* Associate Professor, Emporia State University, School of Business.  Before her academic 
appointment, Dr. Riedy practiced law as a civil litigator in Washington, D.C.  She is a graduate of 
Harvard Law School. 
** Assistant Professor, Emporia State University, School of Business.  He received his Ph.D. 
degree from the University of North Texas.  His primary research interests revolve around 
information security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The title of a 2012 article in The Atlantic observed that “software runs 
the world,” and then, chillingly, asked: “How scared should we be that so 
much of it is so bad?”1  Referring therein to software errors that resulted 
in millions of dollars in losses in securities trading,2 the same question 
might well be asked, however, in regard to the software and systems that 
large and small businesses use to protect against data compromise. 
It has often been observed that software—the programs computer 
systems run on3—are vulnerable4 to an information security breach.  That 
is, one coding error in the software can give hackers unauthorized access 
to confidential information on a computer hard drive that is embedded in 
application software, passing from one networked computer to another, 
or residing on a remote server.5  One technical solution to this problem is 
 
1. James Kwak, Software Runs the World: How Scared Should We Be That So Much of It Is So 
Bad?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/software-
runs-the-world-how-scared-should-we-be-that-so-much-of-it-is-so-bad/260846/. 
2. Id. 
3. Taiwo A. Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Proprieties of the Market in Software 
Vulnerabilities, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 451, 452 (2011). 
4. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 
844 (2015) (“Complete prevention of inaccuracy is impossible . . . [s]oftware code displays 
extraordinary complexity, leading inevitably to bugs. Hackers are adept at finding and exploiting 
vulnerabilities . . . .”); Oriola, supra note 3, at 455 (explaining that most reported computer or 
network security issues result from software vulnerabilities); Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame 
Where Blame Is Due: Software Manufacturer and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software 
Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 43, 51 (2002) (stating that many hackers’ strategies result from 
programmers and system administrators failing to address known security issues and 
vulnerabilities). 
5. WHITE HOUSE, LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE: DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION, § 1(g)(1); see, e.g., 
Bambauer, supra note 4, at 844 (“Complete prevention of inaccuracy is impossible . . . [s]oftware 
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to enhance the security features of computer operating systems and other 
software.6  Another is to employ data security software and related 
systems and services specifically designed to protect against breaches. 
Hundreds of companies now sell such data security software and 
systems.7  Their offerings range from antivirus software for installation 
on home computers8 to enterprise systems designed to detect threats, 
secure networks, and otherwise provide security for some of the largest 
companies in the world.9  Fortune 500 companies reportedly spent $71 
billion on data security systems in 2014.10  Cybersecurity Ventures 
recently projected worldwide spending on commercial cybersecurity 
products and services to eclipse $1 trillion for the period between 2017 
and 2021.11  But like the underlying software running computers and 
programs, security software is also vulnerable to attack.12 
Vulnerabilities in software began to command the technical 
community’s attention when the consumerization of the Internet gained 
speed around 2005,13 and now, the magnitude and severity of the problem 
 
code displays extraordinary complexity, leading inevitably to bugs.”); Oriola, supra note 3, at 463 
(“A faulty code or bug is the Achilles’ heel of computer or network systems security, and one of 
the weakest links through which networked computers are traditionally breached.”). 
6. Emily Kuwahara, Torts v. Contracts: Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to Home Consumers for 
Its Security Flaws?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2007) (describing Microsoft’s “Trust Worthy 
Computing Initiative” to improve the security of its operating systems). 
7. Amanda N. Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory 
Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 758 (2015).  The Authors collected End User License Agreements 
(“EULA”) available on the websites of three hundred seventy of such companies, ranging from 
industry giants providing complex, customized solutions—such as Lockheed Martin—to 
companies selling specific tools such as email filtering. 
8. E.g., McAfee Total Protection, MCAFEEA FOR CONSUMER, 
https://promos.mcafee.com/offer.aspx?id=1094031 (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) (offering McAfee 
Total Protection to consumers for purchase or thirty-day free trial). 
9. Protect Your Digital Enterprise, HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE, 
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/solutions/protect-digital.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
10. Seth Rosenblatt, Modern Security Tactics Fail to Protect Against Malware, Study Finds, 
CNET (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.cnet.com/news/modern-security-tactics-fail-to-protect-against-
malware-new-study-finds/. 
11. Cybersecurity Market Report, CYBERSECURITY VENTURES, 
http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-market-report/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) (noting 
the market for the second quarter of 2016). 
12. See generally Stephen S. Gilstrap, Shifting the Burden in Software Licensing Agreements, 
121 YALE L.J. 1271 (2012) (discussing the increasing potential liabilities associated with software 
security breaches). 
13. In 2005, the number of publicly reported vulnerabilities increased significantly.  Also 
around that time, a large number of easy-to-find bugs in web applications was discovered.  The 
National Vulnerability Database was created, resulting in an increased number of flaws reported 
by large software companies.  See Robert Lemos, Security Flaws on the Rise, Questions Remain, 
REGISTER (Jan. 6, 2006), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/09/computer_security_flaws_on_the_rise/ (discussing the 
increasing amount of vulnerabilities and software flaws). 
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is common knowledge in the IT community.14  Paradoxically, while 
Moore’s Law led to cheap computing power, which allowed for increased 
software complexity (i.e., lines of code, and consequently, the number of 
instructions that can be carried out), software quality has apparently 
declined.15  Thus, presently, the pace at which coding errors are fixed and 
new code developed is about the same.16  Software design and coding 
flaws may be due, in part, to the increasing modularization of software 
development17 via, for example, service-oriented architecture (“SOA”)18, 
and the increased reliance on agile development methods.19  Buyers may 
not demand high-quality software when purchased because updates and 
patches automatically push to software purchasers via the web. 
While security software may not be as complex as operating systems 
(the latter containing a fair amount of security-related as well as 
functional features),20 security software suffers from similar weaknesses 
and is prone to similar vulnerabilities.  For example, antivirus software, 
 
14. Vulnerability Type Distributions in CVE, NVD, 
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics-results?adv_search=true&cves=on&cvss_version=3 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
15. Moore’s Law states that “[t]he number of transistors incorporated in a chip will 
approximately double every 24 months.”  Arnab Hazari, Electronics Are About to Reach Their 
Limit in Processing Power—but There Is a Solution, QUARTZ (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://qz.com/852770/theres-a-limit-to-how-small-we-can-make-transistors-but-the-solution-is-
photonic-chips/ (quoting Gordon Moore, Intel cofounder). 
16. Verizon’s 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON, 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017) 
[hereinafter Verizon’s Report]. 
17. Historically, software was written in-house which led to the creation of information silos—
isolated applications with no common interfaces to share data with other packages.  In contrast, 
modern-day software is designed with interoperability in mind, which basically means that it takes 
advantage of common interfaces to share data.  Thus, a larger IT infrastructure can be built from 
building blocks coming from different vendors. 
18. Service-oriented architecture (“SOA”) is a methodology in which applications rely on the 
World Wide Web and other such services available in a network.  Implementing SOA “can involve 
developing applications that use services, making applications available as services so that other 
applications can use those services, or both.”  Ed Ort, Service-Oriented Architecture and Web 
Services: Concepts, Technologies, and Tools, ORACLE (Apr. 2005), 
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/articles/javase/soaterms-138190.html#soaterms. 
19. Agile methods differ from traditional waterfall methods in that they favor iterative software 
design cycles.  Such an approach tends to be more suitable for projects where the requirements are 
characterized by high volatility.  Barry Boehm, Get Ready For Agile Methods, With Care, 
COMPUTER, Jan. 2002, at 64, 66. 
20. Several categories of metrics for “complexity” exist.  McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity and 
Halstead metrics are among the most widely recognized.  The former is based on the control of 
flow of the application.  The latter uses program size and effort to evaluate measures like number 
of operators, operands, etc.  ADITYA P. MATHUR, FOUNDATIONS OF SOFTWARE TESTING 29–30 
(2008).  In addition, simpler measures like source lines of code (“SLOC”) may also be used to 
measure the complexity of a program. 
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as identified by vendors listed in the Cybersecurity 500 ranking,21 is 
susceptible to a number of vulnerability categories, including bypassing 
access control and permissions, privilege elevation, denial of service 
(e.g., resource management errors and buffer overflow), code injections 
and execution, memory corruption, and others.22  The more complex the 
software package, the greater the number of vulnerabilities.  To make 
matters worse, different products can suffer from the exact same 
vulnerability, such that one type of hack can exploit all products 
simultaneously.23  Notwithstanding the expenditure of an extraordinary 
amount of resources to prevent compromise, data comprised of millions 
of customer records containing personal information housed by a 
company (e.g., social security and credit card numbers, other financial 
information, and medical records) and confidential business information 
are still insecure.24 
Hackers exploit that insecurity to steal or compromise the data.25  
Intentional hacking is by far the most common cause of stolen or 
compromised data.26  Today, hacking is a lucrative business carried out 
by well-trained cybercriminals with malicious intent to exploit data for 
potentially enormous amounts of money.  It is estimated that external 
actors—the majority of whom are motivated by direct or indirect 
financial gain—cause roughly 80 percent of data breaches.27  Other 
motives, such as revenge, entertainment, or ideology, rarely play a role.28  
Personal information about individuals, such as names and addresses, 
may sell for as much as three dollars on the Dark Web (i.e., the 
 
21. Cybersecurity 500, CYBERSECURITY VENTURES, 
http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-500/ (last visited May 6, 2017).  Some common 
vendors include: Avast Software, ESET, Malwarebytes, McAfee, Kaspersky, Symantec, etc.  
Windows Anti-Malware Market Share Reports, METADEFENDER, 
https://www.metadefender.com/stats/anti-malware-market-share-report#!/?date=2017-02-27 (last 
visited May 6, 2017). 
22. Vulnerabilities by Type, CVE DETAILS, http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-
types.php (last visited May 6, 2017). 
23. For example, in 2012, it was discovered that specially crafted archive files could fly under 
the radar and avoid malware detection by several major antivirus products on the market.  CVE-
2012-1459 Detail, NVD, https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-1459 (last 
visited May 6, 2017). 
24. See infra notes 29–44 (recognizing personal information's high price tag). 
25. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011 (2014) 
(discussing various approaches to mitigating cyberattacks). 
26. Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-
breach (last visited May 6, 2017) (reflecting that more than 70 percent of record breaches were due 
to hacking or “unknown”).  Other culprits include insiders and lost or stolen data storage devices, 
among others.  Marian K. Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, Yes, Your Personal Data Is at Risk: Get Over 
It!, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (2016). 
27. Verizon’s Report, supra note 16. 
28. Id. 
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underground Internet),29 and social security numbers sell for a dollar.30  
The price of financial information, such as credit card numbers and 
PayPal or eBay account credentials, ranges from one to eighty dollars per 
record.  The Dark Web markets where stolen data is bought and sold are 
often quite sophisticated.  For example, those with a well-established 
reputation actually have a return policy, which allows the buyers to 
receive a refund if the purchased information is no longer active (i.e., a 
credit card has been blocked or login credentials have been changed or 
removed).31 
All this stolen data can add up to a substantial profit.  For example, 
three hackers caught and charged with, inter alia, committing securities 
fraud on individuals whose identities were stolen from JPMorgan Chase 
allegedly made hundreds of millions of dollars.32 
This potential profit begets an astonishing number of data breaches and 
a massive number of corrupted files.  It has been estimated that 
approximately one in five organizations will likely suffer from a material 
data breach in the next two years.33  In January 2015, cybersecurity firm 
FireEye reported that 96 percent of the 1,600 computer networks that it 
monitored were breached in 2014.34  Many of the big data breaches made 
headline news.  For example, it is widely known that in 2014, North 
Korean hackers compromised Sony’s computers and databases.35  In the 
process, the hackers destroyed the company’s servers and personal 
computers and wiped Sony’s databases clean, resulting in a temporary 
disruption of business functions.36  Millions of customer records 
 
29. Follow the Data: Dissecting Data Breaches and Debunking the Myths, TREND MICRO 
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/follow-the-
data.  A related source of illicit revenue, but not one specifically addressed herein, is the black 
market for information regarding software vulnerabilities—avenues for data theft—including the 
sale of information regarding so-called “zero day” attacks.  Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1078. 
30. Don Reisinger, Here’s How Much Your Social Security Number Is Worth on the Dark Web, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/03/social-security-dark-web/. 
31. Omri Toppol, The Industrialization of the Underground Economy, BLOGDOG (Apr. 7, 
2015), https://getlogdog.com/blogdog/the-industrialization-of-the-underground-economy/. 
32. Aarti Shahani, 3 Charged in Hacking Case Against JPMorgan Chase, 11 Other Firms, NPR 
(Nov. 11, 2015, 5:07 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/11/455577683/3-charged-in-hacking-
case-against-jpmorgan-chase-11-other-firms. 
33. ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE, 2015 DATA PROTECTION & BREACH READINESS GUIDE 6 (Feb. 
13, 2015), https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/dpd_2015_guide.pdf. 
34. FIREEYE, MAGINOT REVISITED: MORE REAL-WORLD RESULTS FROM REAL-WORLD 
TESTS 3 (2015), https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-maginot-revisited.pdf. 
35. It was widely rumored, if not proven, that hackers targeted Sony because of Sony’s pending 
release of a comedy show about the assassination of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Un.  Ari 
Shapiro, Sony CEO Reflects on Immobilizing Cyberattack 1 Year Later, NPR (Nov. 20, 2015, 5:59 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/20/456831542/sony-ceo-reflects-on-immobilizing-cyber-
attack-1-year-later. 
36. Id. 
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containing personal information were allegedly compromised,37 as were 
personnel records dating back over a decade.38  The hack of JPMorgan in 
2015 resulted in the compromise of some seventy-six million client 
records containing personal and financial information.39  Overall, in 2015 
alone, hundreds of millions of data records housed in the databases and 
systems of American businesses were hacked,40 and the numbers climbed 
even higher in 2016.41  Government databases are, of course, another 
target for hackers.  In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management 
reported that hackers stole the background investigation records of an 
estimated 21.5 million current, former, and prospective federal 
employees.42  These examples are from data breaches that were reported 
and confirmed, but the overall universe of data compromise is 
undoubtedly much larger. 
The security software systems installed to protect against unauthorized 
data disclosure did not detect these breaches.  Instead, either law 
enforcement agencies or other third-party entities unrelated to the 
breached organization discovered about 80 percent of breaches.43 
The total cost of all this data compromise may be impossible to 
calculate, but from some specific examples and industry surveys, one can 
reasonably conclude that hacking exacts a steep price from businesses 
and consumers.  In one case alone, Target, which suffered a massive data 
breach in 2013,44 reportedly lost a total of about $236 million in breach-
related costs,45 pledged to spend $100 million upgrading its security,46 
and spent additional money defending against lawsuits brought on behalf 
of its 110 million customers whose credit and debit card information had 
been stolen47 and by banks and credit unions that incurred costs replacing 
 
37. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
955 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
38. Elena Kvochko & Rajiv Pant, Why Data Breaches Don’t Hurt Stock Prices, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Mar. 31, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/why-data-breaches-dont-hurt-stock-prices. 
39. Shahani, supra note 32. 
40. David McCandless, World’s Biggest Data Breaches, INFO. IS BEAUTIFUL, 
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks (last 
updated Apr. 25, 2017). 
41. Paul Ausick, 2016 Data Breaches 10% Higher Than a Year Ago, 24/7 WALL STREET (Apr. 
21, 2016. 8:50 AM), http://247wallst.com/technology-3/2016/04/21/2016-data-breaches-10-
higher-than-a-year-ago/. 
42. Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecurity Incidents, OPM.GOV 
https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ (last visited May 6, 2017). 
43. Verizon’s Report, supra note 16. 
44. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
45. Kvochko & Pant, supra note 38. 
46. In re Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1157. 
47. Id. at 1157. 
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those cards and otherwise remediating the results of the breach.48  Sony 
reportedly spent $53 million after its 2014 breach just in repairing its IT 
and financial systems.49  The greater the number of records 
compromised, the greater the cost of remediating the breach.  But, on 
average, the cost to any American company is estimated to be $7 
million.50 
Not every hack will be so costly to the breached company because 
insurance may cover some of the out-of-pocket losses,51 and the net cost 
may be but a small percentage of the company’s revenues.52  But overall, 
companies spend billions of dollars dealing with the consequences of data 
breaches.53  Consumers will presumably pay some portion of this cost as 
companies pass data breach remediation expenses into the price of goods 
and services, and consumers also incur costs directly as a result of the 
breach.  One analysis found that consumers spent $13.3 billion in losses 
between 2005 and 2011,54 and $13.1 billion in 2013 alone,55 resulting 
from illegal purchases from stolen credit and debit cards,56 lost time and 
money correcting account information, and other additional costs 
necessary to remediate the misuse of personal information.57 
If all this money and time spent replacing computers, databases, and 
credit cards are not bad enough, the prospect of more pervasive and more 
dangerous consequences from data breaches in the future ought to give 
one pause.  For individuals, consider all the personal data that is 
 
48. Kvochko & Pant, supra note 38. 
49. Shapiro, supra note 35. 
50. 2016 Ponemon Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/security/data-breach/ (last visited May 6, 2017). 
51. Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security Insurance: Navigating the Landscape of a 
Growing Field, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 379, 384 (2014) (noting that 
cybersecurity insurance is the “fastest growing segment of the industry”).  Of course, insuring 
against the risk of a cyberattack is also a cost to the company: premiums for cybersecurity insurance 
totaled $1.3 billion in 2013.  Id. 
52. Robert Hackett, How Much Do Data Breaches Cost Big Companies?  Shockingly Little, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/how-much-do-data-breaches-actually-
cost-big-companies-shockingly-little/. 
53. 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, IBM, http://www-
01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-
bin/ssialias?infotype=SA&subtype=WH&htmlfid=SEW03053WWEN (last visited May 6, 2017). 
54. LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, IDENTITY THEFT REPORTED BY HOUSEHOLDS, 2005–2010, at 5 (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/itrh0510.pdf. 
55. Al Pascual, 2013 Identity Fraud Report: Data Breaches Becoming a Treasure Trove for 
Fraudsters, JAVELIN (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2013-
identity-fraud-report-data-breaches-becoming-treasure-trove-fraudsters. 
56. Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Sept. 27, 2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5410. 
57. Id. 
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increasingly becoming available from “smart” homes and devices linked 
to the Internet.  This “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), or “ubiquitous 
computing,”58 is still in its infancy, but growing rapidly.  “Over the past 
few years, practically every household item within reach has been 
technologically upgraded and rendered ‘smart’: toothbrushes, cutlery, 
baby monitors, refrigerators, thermostats, slow cookers, sprinkler 
systems, sex toys, even the locks in doors.”59  The makers of the smart 
devices collect and store that data.60  Where we go, what we want, and 
what we do is all transmitted to company databases via Siri and Alexa.61  
Given that present-day devices belonging to the IoT family are still in 
their infancy, little doubt remains that new vulnerabilities will emerge 
and be exploited.62 
What hackers could do with this data is anyone’s guess, but a home 
break-in and serious blackmail come to mind, as does true identity theft—
not just an illicit charge or two on a credit card—or the devices 
themselves could be turned against individuals.  For example, if a hacker 
compromises a car’s control system, that car could come to an abrupt stop 
on a busy freeway.63  For a business, consider the possibility of a Stuxnet-
like64 attack in which commercial operations are hijacked and altered in 
ways imperceptible to and undetectable by the company, and which have 
the effect of reducing the company’s competitive edge and ultimately, 
perhaps, its very survival.65 
 
58. UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (Mar. 17, 1996, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/UbiHome.html (last visited May 6, 2017). 
59. Jacob Silverman, Just How ‘Smart’ Do You Want Your Blender to Be?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/magazine/just-how-smart-do-you-want-
your-blender-to-be.html. 
60. Id. 
61. Id.  Such “personal assistants” respond to voice commands to access digital connections, 
including the internet and applications on computers and mobile devices. 
62. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner’s 2015 Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies Identifies 
the Computing Innovations That Organizations Should Monitor (Aug. 18, 2015), 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3114217. 
63. Brenda Craig, First Car-Hacking Class Action Filed Against Ford, GM, and Toyota, 
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (July 25, 2015, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/data-breach/interview-internet-lawyers-
technology-lawyer-2-20800.html#.VjJKfUauzTp. 
64. Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in 
History, WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-
digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/1.  In short, Stuxnet is a piece of malware affecting 
industrial control systems deployed over large industrial facilities.  It allows the perpetrator to take 
control of such systems without authorization.  The prevailing rumor is that it was a result of 
cooperation of the United States and Israeli governments targeting Iranian nuclear power plants 
(until it got out of control). 
65. Threats to national security from terrorist or “rogue” government attacks are, of course, 
perhaps of even greater concern.  How best to safeguard data housed and used by government 
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It is probably just a fact of a heavily digitized life that data cannot be 
made completely secure from unauthorized access.  No software (other 
than perhaps the simplest of software) can feasibly be error free,66 and so 
long as these crimes pay, hackers will search for and exploit those 
errors.67  But in general, society has reached a consensus that the number 
and extent of data breaches can and should be reduced.68 
One of the many legal measures aimed at improving data security69 
that legal scholars propose focuses on the particular issue of software 
vendors’ limited responsibility for security vulnerabilities in the mass-
market products they sell.70  As discussed in more detail below, vendors 
of consumer software, in particular, almost universally shield themselves 
from liability in the event of a data breach through disclaimers in the sale 
or license agreement, thereby eliminating the threat of litigation as an 
 
agencies is beyond the scope of this Article. 
66. Bambauer, supra note 4, at 844. 
67. E.g., Trevor Ford, Cybersecurity Legislation for an Evolving World, 50 U.S.F.L. REV. 119, 
121 (2016) (“Currently, both nation-state and criminal actors are conducting elaborate and 
persistent campaigns to compromise the security of their targets . . . .”). 
68. To that end, for example, in regard to the security of consumer data only, Congress and the 
states regularly consider new legislation designed to ensure consumer privacy and protect personal 
information stored in company databases.  E.g., Natasha Singer, White House Proposes Broad 
Consumer Data Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/white-house-proposes-broad-consumer-data-
privacy-bill.html?_r=0 (discussing recent proposed legislation that would provide Americans with 
greater control over companies’ access to their personal information).  Regulators also propose new 
rules, standards, and guidance.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUT. CRIME & 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., Best Practices for Victim Response and Reporting 
of Cyber Incidents (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/speeches/attachments/2015/04/29/criminal_divisio
n_guidance_on_best_practices_for_victim_response_and_reporting_cyber_incidents.pdf 
(suggesting steps to take before, during, and after a cyber intrusion). 
69. It would surely be impossible even to summarize all of these, given that hundreds, if not 
thousands, of scholarly articles have been published on the general topic of data security. 
70. E.g., T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for Software Developers: A Law & Economics 
Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 199, 230–31 (2009) (discussing certain 
aspects of the consumer’s experience with software that are within the consumer’s control rather 
than the seller’s); Michael A. Cusumano, Who Is Liable for Bugs and Security Flaws in Software, 
47 COMM. ACM 25, 26 (Mar. 2004), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4fa3/39da13b3fe84062778af73ed688ffc25bd20.pdf; Gilstrap, 
supra note 12, at 1272–73 (explaining that despite increasing potential liabilities associated with 
security breaches, software licensing agreements between vendors and businesses continue to limit 
vendors’ liabilities); Oriola, supra note 3, a 514–16; Pinkney, supra note 4, at 46 (stating that the 
government has more than once protected software manufacturers from liability for harm caused 
by software failure); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement 
of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1558 (2005) (explaining that “those responsible for 
securing our personal data are rarely the ones who pay the cost of securing it”); Michael D. Scott, 
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?  67 MD. L. REV. 425, 
432–33 (2008) (listing the lack of significant risks to vendors in distributing insecure software as 
one reason why certain software is insecure). 
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incentive to produce better software.71  But legal scholarship has paid less 
attention to this commercial market for security software and systems.72  
This Article attempts to fill that gap and its empirical analysis of an end-
user license agreement (“EULA”) (i.e., an agreement between the 
software vendor or developer and the software user) for such security 
systems demonstrates a similar liability shield in the contractual terms.  
On the face of these license agreements, the commercial user—the 
company that purchases the security software—bears the risk of loss in 
the event of a data breach.  This contractual allocation of risk may be a 
perfectly reasonable choice for the licensee, for it can insure against that 
risk.73  But to the extent the lack of accountability on the part of security 
software vendors undermines the goal of data security, this scenario 
should be unacceptable to the millions of consumers whose sensitive 
personal information, housed by the purchasers of commercial security 
systems, is consequently more vulnerable to theft and misuse.74 
This Article proposes, as a solution, that the evolving role of consumer 
protection agencies in promoting information security can, and should, 
include a specific focus on commercial-security software.  The Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), in particular, has authority to protect 
consumers from “unfair” or “deceptive” conduct related to data 
security.75  In regard to protecting data against unauthorized disclosure, 
the FTC mostly targets companies that fail to employ reasonable data 
security measures.76  These failures, the FTC alleges, create a “substantial 
risk of harm” to consumers and constitute an “unfair trade practice.”77  A 
vulnerability in the security software used by a company to protect 
against data disclosure can also pose a “substantial risk of harm” to the 
consumers whose data is housed by that company, unless that 
vulnerability is detected and quickly patched. 
This Article proposes, then, that regulators take the following 
 
71. See infra Part I.A. (The “Unusual” Legal Cocoon Woven by Software Vendors). 
72. Gilstrap’s scholarship, for example, aims at security software, but not, specifically, the 
commercial market for such software.  Gilstrap, supra note 12, at 1273. 
73. See generally Garrie & Mann, supra note 51 (discussing the growing importance of 
cybersecurity insurance and related issues). 
74. This is, of course, the classic “externalities” problem.  See Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1030 
(“Insecure [IT] users and providers do not suffer the full costs of the harms they generate.”). 
75. See generally Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 955, 963–66 (2016) (describing the common law approach of the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)). 
76. Id. at 957–58. 
77. Amanda R. Moncada, When a Data Breach Comes-a-Knockin’, the FTC Comes A-Blockin’: 
Extending the FTC’s Authority to Cover Data-Security Breaches, 64 DEPAUL L. REV 911, 919 
(2015). 
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position:78 if a commercial security software vendor knows or should 
have known of a vulnerability in its software, it could be subject to an 
“unfair” or “deceptive” trade practice claim if the vendor does not notify 
all of its licensees of that defect.79  This proposal—a new take on “caveat 
emptor”—accomplishes at least two important objectives.  First, it 
encourages information exchange, a strategy which is increasingly 
promoted as an effective weapon against cybercrime.80  Not all software 
vulnerabilities would create such a significant risk of harm that the failure 
to disclose would qualify as an “unfair trade practice,” but the risk of such 
a charge would presumably incentivize vendors to share vulnerabilities 
information.  Second, to the extent commercial licensees are bound by 
contractual limitations on holding security software vendors accountable 
by filing suit, or are simply unwilling to bear the cost of litigation, 
regulatory agencies and consumers could step in and recover for the 
breach.  Though new parties could recover for the breach, this limited 
definition of “unfair trade practice” would not unleash the floodgates to 
litigation and would account for the fact that software cannot be made 
wholly “secure.”  And surely the failure to disclose a known vulnerability 
would meet anyone’s definition of “unfair.” 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins with a discussion 
regarding the prevailing and persistent problem of software vendor 
immunity from responsibility for security failures, and proposed 
solutions.  What follows is a summary, in broad strokes, of the 
functionality of a specific subset of software: commercial data security 
systems.  This Article next describes its empirical analysis of commercial 
security software license agreements and observations regarding the 
respective liability of licensor and licensee in the event of a data breach, 
and discusses the reasons commercial buyers seem either unable or 
unwilling to hold the vendors responsible.  Part II turns to this Article’s 
proposal for breaking this impasse.  First, it explains how encouraging 
“buyer beware” notifications fits well with the current legal trend 
promoting information exchange to combat cybercrime.  Second, it 
discusses the FTC’s current and evolving role in cybersecurity, explains 
why that role can readily encompass the regulation of commercial 
 
78. Whether this position should be taken through rulemaking, or through “common law” 
development or other administrative means is beyond the scope of this Article. 
79. Michael D. Scott proposes that the FTC can and should use its authority to take action 
against “unfair and deceptive trade practices” to prosecute vendors who distribute “insecure” 
software.  Scott, supra note 70, at 482–83.  The proposal herein is more specific and targeted—
avoiding various troublesome issues such as defining “insecure”—and is based on a differing set 
of observations and arguments, including this Article’s empirical analysis of commercial EULAs. 
80. See generally Ford, supra note 67 (discussing the increase in frequency and sophistication 
of cyberattacks); see infra Part II.A. (discussing information sharing as a data-security measure). 
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software vendors who fail to notify of a vulnerability, and notes how state 
trade laws might also come into play.  Third, it discusses why, in this 
context, targeted regulation with a limited option for private litigation is 
a better option than a pure liability regime. 
I.  DISCLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY 
As this Part summarizes, scholars have well documented the fact that 
software vendors almost universally shield themselves from liability in 
the event of a breach of contract.  One might expect, however, that in the 
commercial market for software and, in particular, for security software, 
a different pattern would emerge.  Sophisticated companies purchasing 
billions of dollars of software and services to secure data would surely 
demand that the vendors of that software and those services share in the 
responsibility in the event of a data breach.  But this Article’s empirical 
analysis suggests otherwise. 
A.  The “Unusual”81 Legal Cocoon Woven by Software Vendors 
As has been observed through both qualitative82 and empirical 
research,83 software vendors almost universally employ standard form 
contract terms that disclaim warranties and limit liability in the event the 
software fails, resulting in a security breach.84  Courts generally uphold 
contractual disclaimers of express and implied warranties in software 
license agreements.85  Though a contractual disclaimer may be 
 
81. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1034 (referring to the prevailing use of contractual limitations 
on liability in software licenses). 
82. E.g., Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 579 (1999) (“One can read hundreds of click-wrap, Web site, shrink-
wrap, and other mass-market transactions and have yet to find a single example of a software 
licensor willing to provide any warranty for its software.”). 
83. An analysis of standard form contracts licensing dozens of different types of software 
demonstrated that 90 percent disclaimed implied warranties and 89 percent disclaimed liability for 
consequential damages.  Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract?  An 
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 703 (Dec. 
2007).  Express warranties were generally limited to conformance to specifications.  Id. at 697.  See 
also Robert J. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2008–2009) (presenting empirical evidence of widespread use of 
disclaimers in consumer software license agreements). 
84. See generally Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 81 (analyzing standard form contracts in 
software license agreements to document the prevalence of terms such as license scope and 
warranties); Rustad, supra note 82 (explaining the importance of the Uniform Computer 
Information Transaction Act, the statute which, among other things, enables expanding commercial 
practice in computer information transactions by commercial usage and agreement of the parties); 
Scott, supra note 70 (exploring why software vendors are not being held liable for distributing 
insecure code and why current laws regarding negligence and product liability do not concern 
insecure software). 
85. Scott, supra note 70, at 437. 
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unenforceable because of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations 
made by the vendor regarding the software’s expected performance,86 
courts are generally reluctant to disregard a clear limitation of warranty 
in the terms of the contract.87  The limited type of express warranty that 
is commonly found in the standard EULA is so “content-less” that, as one 
scholar observed, “[n]o reported decision has unequivocally held that a 
software vendor has breached an express warranty.”88  Though an 
“unconscionable” disclaimer may be unenforceable,89 courts generally 
enforce limitations on liability in software license agreements90 and 
infrequently find this exception applicable in the commercial context.91  
In a few jurisdictions the “failure of essential purpose” doctrine may be 
effective in overcoming a limitation of liability clause.92  But for the most 
part, purchasers or licensees have no contractual recourse against the 
software vendor in the event of security failures.93 
 
86. See, e.g., J.C. Whitney & Co. v. Renaissance Software Corp., No. 99 C 3714, 2000 WL 
556610, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2000) (denying a motion to dismiss based on disclaimer when 
the plaintiff sufficiently pled facts supporting fraud in the inducement claim). 
87. E.g., Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Open Solutions, Inc., No. C12-2070, 2013 WL 997894, at *3–5 
(N.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2013). 
88. Scott, supra note 70, at 437. 
89. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2004). 
90. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1034 (“End-user license agreements typically disclaim all 
liability on the vendor’s part, and tort law has failed to impose a duty of care on software 
manufacturers.”). 
91. Scott, supra note 70, at 438. 
92. See generally Gilstrap, supra note 12 (arguing that licensing agreements between vendors 
and businesses restrict vendors’ liabilities, which allow them to avoid the liability following a 
security breach). 
93. It has been noted that software vendors are effectively using the “risk allocation provisions 
of the [Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)]” to shift liability for software failures to the users in 
the EULAs.  Scott, supra note 70, at 427.  Some, and perhaps the majority of courts apply the UCC 
to software transactions.  E.g., Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time to Acknowledge That 
UCC Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531, 552–
53 (2011) (explaining courts’ evolution in applying article 2 of the UCC to software transactions).  
But many do not.  E.g., Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1359 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (vacating 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on a claim against a licensing agreement for a board 
game); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); 
Attachmate Corp. v. Health Net, Inc., No. C09-1161 MJP, 2010 WL 4365833, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 26, 2010) (same).  The emerging trend seems to be to consider the issue as being fact specific.  
Gabriela Rojas-Lozano v. Google, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1108–09 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  Whether 
the UCC applies may be determinative in regard to various contract law issues.  E.g., Lorin 
Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 465–66 
(2000) (illustrating that the usual image of a software transaction as a customer who purchases pre-
packaged software from a retail store falls within a “sale of goods” within article 2 of the UCC).  
But regarding risk-allocation provisions, it appears the distinction makes little difference.  At 
common law, limitations of damages provisions, particularly a provision precluding recovery for 
consequential damages, in commercial contracts are generally enforceable, as are limitations on 
warranties. 
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These provisions pose a formidable obstacle against breach of contract 
liability in the event a hacker breaches a vulnerability in the software and 
compromises the user’s data.94  The lack of significant legal risk in the 
event of a security breach is one of the reasons insecure software is sold.95  
The solution, according to many scholars, is to mold traditional tort and 
contract law principles in such a way that software vendors can be held 
accountable notwithstanding the contractual disclaimers.96  As most of 
these same scholars acknowledge, however, recovery based on a tort-
based claim would encounter many, perhaps insurmountable problems, 
including, inter alia, the economic loss rule, which, in many jurisdictions, 
precludes recovery in tort where the injury does not produce pecuniary 
damages and there is no claim for physical injury, death, or other property 
damages.97  And contractual limitations on liability are generally 
 
94. See generally Gilstrap, supra note 12 (arguing that licensing agreements between vendors 
and businesses restrict vendors’ liabilities, which allow them to avoid the liability following a 
security breach). 
95. Scott, supra note 70, at 433 (exploring why software vendors are not being held liable for 
distributing insecure code and why current laws regarding negligence and product liability do not 
concern insecure software).  There are other reasons, of course, including the cost and complexity 
of producing “error-free” code, as discussed above. 
96. E.g., Gilstrap, supra note 12, at 1280 (arguing for a broader adoption of the “failure of 
essential purpose” doctrine of contract law); Pinkney, supra note 5, at 69 (analyzing possible tort 
remedies); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybersecurity Policy: Extending Learned 
Hand’s Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 ISJLP 237, 239 (2007) (“We 
argue that companies have a duty to provide reasonable information security practices under the 
common law of torts.”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 239; Scott, supra note 70, at 441 
(analyzing opportunities and barriers to the assertion of various tort claims); Daniel M. White, The 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002: A Potemkin Village, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
369, 401 (2010) (arguing that government purchasers should demand “real” warranties from 
software vendors); Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for 
Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
745, 746 (2005) (“[W]e argue for the adoption of a strict liability regime for software failure that 
produces physical injury and offer supporting arguments for why such a move is both necessary 
and sensible.”).  Aside from these private contractual issues, a related body of scholarship analyzes 
whether and to what extent software should be regulated.  E.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-
Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 296–97 
(2006) (explaining that most software programs are intricate and interrelated sequences of code, 
which create complex programs that might entice hackers); Peter Sloan, The Reasonable 
Information Security Program, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 25 (2014) (arguing that to establish a 
reasonable information security program, an organization should consider applicable legal 
requirements to implement security safeguards, including obligations to third-parties); David 
Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 294 (2014) (discussing 
the efficacy of two modes of cybersecurity regulation using a mixed-methods empirical approach); 
see generally Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319 (2005) 
(exploring the increasing use of code and informational-technology architecture to deal with 
societal issues and problems). 
97. E.g., Scott, supra note 70, at 481 (“However, for the most common forms of injury caused 
by defective security software—loss of sensitive corporate and third party data—the economic loss 
rule will continue to bar most claims.”). 
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enforceable.98  As a result of all this, “[t]o date, despite an epidemic of 
computer security flaws, no plaintiff has recovered damages for 
cybercrimes enabled by flawed software under either a contract theory or 
under a tort theory.”99 
Though scholars, such as Stephen Gilstrap, specifically address 
security software, most scholarship regarding the lack of accountability 
for insecure software generically concerns mere “software.”100  Much of 
the data is drawn from consumer transactions.101  The analyses of the 
reasons for the failure of the market to demand more secure software rest 
on principles applicable primarily in the consumer, “mass-market” 
setting.102  For reasons discussed in these scholarly articles, it is perhaps 
not surprising that, in this particular market, the rule of caveat emptor 
generally rules. 
One might expect, by way of contrast, that in the commercial market 
for software and, in particular, for security software, a different pattern 
would emerge.  Sophisticated companies that purchase billions of dollars 
of software and services to secure data would surely demand that the 
vendors of that software and those services themselves share in the 
responsibility in the event of a data breach.  But this Article’s empirical 
analysis suggests otherwise. 
B.  Even More Unusual Commercial Security Software in the Same 
Cocoon 
Information security for the commercial market ranges from desktop 
antivirus software used by a small law firm103—here overlapping with 
the consumer market—to complex beasts including cybersecurity 
 
98. E.g., id. at 437 (explaining that warranty disclaimers are presumed valid and construed 
strictly in favor of the buyer). 
99. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1567; see also Kuwahara, supra note 6 (describing 
Microsoft’s “Trust Worthy Computing Initiative” to improve the security of its operating systems). 
100. Gilstrap, supra note 12. 
101. E.g., Rustad, supra note 82, at 566.  In Marotta-Wurgler’s empirical study, over half of the 
standard form contracts were for “business” rather than consumer software, according to the author.  
Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 83, at 689.  But given that the average cost of all products in the data 
set was $763, it does not appear that many of these contracts were for truly “commercial grade” 
software products. 
102. E.g., Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1033 (discussing the problem of externalities arising 
from the insecure use of “her” computer); Oriola, supra note 3, at 468 (arguing that the market can 
and does demand more secure software, using steps taken by Microsoft to reduce vulnerabilities in 
its Windows operating system as an example); Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable 
Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y 45, 70–71 (discussing “Alice” and her decision regarding the purchase of secure versus 
insecure software). 
103. This observation is based on the Authors’ experience. 
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auditing services, data mining and analytics,104 and various “proactive” 
measures intended to quickly detect and respond to attempted attacks 
such as software and hardware firewalls and intrusion detection and/or 
prevention systems.105  Data security systems also include measures for 
“patching” leaks106 and for otherwise minimizing the damage if a breach 
occurs.107  The more complex data security system packages include a 
wide range of services including, inter alia, data security training108 and 
various system and security support measures such as assistance in 
installation, maintenance, analysis, and response to security threats.109  
As with anything having to do with data, however, at the core of most, if 
not all, data security systems is software.  Regardless of whether it is a 
simple script, or a complex data transformation procedure, software 
serves as the middleman between hardware and data.  It handles the logic 
of how data is being processed and controls the access to hardware 
resources.  Some information-security vendors offer software solutions 
only and others deliver so-called security appliances, which are basically 
dedicated stand-alone devices comprising of both hardware and 
software.110 
Notwithstanding the variety of functions security software performs, 
the license agreements for that software are quite similar.  The Authors 
of this Article performed text mining on the EULAs posted on the 
websites of close to 400 data security vendors, ranging from global 
conglomerates with data security divisions111 to niche start-up 
companies,112 which demonstrated a surprising similarity among the 
 
104. E.g., Craig et al., supra note 7, at 758–59 (discussing a survey of industry practices to show 
that more than 75 percent of firms offer data-mining, analytics, and detection systems). 
105. See generally id. (explaining proactive cybersecurity measures to defend against 
“Advanced Persistent Threats”). 
106. E.g., Oriola, supra note 3, at 468 (arguing that a “find-and-corrective” patch strategy to 
fend against unscrupulous groups or malicious hackers). 
107. E.g., Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1054 (explaining that in the event of an attack or a 
breach, using heterogeneous systems—like variegated code and hardware—as opposed to 
homogenous systems cause fewer parts of that system to be affected). 
108. Craig et al., supra note 7, at 760. 
109. E.g., Services Overview, LOGRHYTHM, https://logrhythm.com/services/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2017) (offering security intelligence for private firms). 
110. These devices offer features such as firewall, virtual private network (“VPN”), traffic 
shaping, content filtering, intrusion detection, network connectivity, packet inspection, etc.  In 
essence, these are nothing other than specialized computers with a central processing unit, memory, 
storage, etc., that are designed and optimized to perform specific tasks. 
111. See, e.g., Cyber Solutions, LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://cyber.lockheedmartin.com/ (last 
visited May 10, 2017) (offering cybersecurity for private firms). 
112. See, e.g., Open Source Application Security, BLACK DUCK SOFTWARE, 
https://www.blackducksoftware.com/solutions/application-security (last visited May 28, 2017) 
(offering information security for private firms). 
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EULAs, and between these agreements and “mass market” consumer 
software license agreements. 
Text mining is a semiautomated process aimed at extracting patterns 
from unstructured data sources, more specifically textual data.113  Some 
of the most common applications of text mining include information 
extraction, topic tracking, summarization, categorization, and clustering.  
Like any analytical methodology, text mining follows a standardized 
process.  In general, this process can be broken down into three 
sequentially organized steps: (1) establishing a corpus, (2) creating a 
term-document matrix (“TDM”), and (3) extracting knowledge.114  Even 
though these steps are organized serially, the reciprocal relationships 
between them result in an iterative overall process.  Before the TDM is 
created, the documents are preprocessed (i.e., cleansed) to eliminate as 
much “noise” from the documents as possible.  The cleansing is iterative, 
and requires subject-matter expertise to identify relevant and redundant 
terms.  The TDM relates the remaining terms to the documents based on 
selected measures, such as the frequency with which the term appears in 
the documents.  The underlying assumption behind such an approach is 
that these frequencies can be used to illustrate (i.e., summarize) the 
essence of a given document. 
The Authors of this Article obtained a corpus of 370 documents 
extracted from the vendor sites (the set contained only documents that 
were publicly available).  The corpus contained a total of 1,444,017 
words and 17,217 unique word forms.  The EULAs varied in length from 
170 words to almost 16,000 words.  Because the documents significantly 
varied in length, the Authors computed a vocabulary density (i.e., a 
numerical value representing words commonly used in the documents in 
the corpus).115  Here, the vocabulary density ranged from 0.120 to 0.571.  
Although one would expect software license agreements to contain 
common words because all contracts have core common elements (e.g., 
recitation of “consideration”), these figures demonstrate a very high 
degree of commonality.  The Authors then cleansed the corpus and 
created the TDM by extracting the words “warranty,” and “liability,” and 
case/number variations of these words.116 
 
113. GABE IGNATOW & RADA MIHALCEA. TEXT MINING: A GUIDEBOOK FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 4 (2016). 
114. Dursun Delen & Martin D. Crossland, Seeding the Survey and Analysis of Research 
Literature with Text Mining, 34 EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS 1707, 1711 (2008). 
115. The number is obtained by dividing the total words by the unique words, which shows how 
many words will occur, on average, before a new word is encountered.  Zachary Booth Simpson, 
Vocabulary Analysis of Project Gutenberg (May 2000), http://www.mine-
control.com/zack/guttenberg/. 
116. Specifically, first, we split the documents into sequences of tokens, which were identified 
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The TDM demonstrates the following regarding the warranty language 
of the 370 EULAs: 60 percent (225 EULAs) contained an “as is” phrase, 
including “as is and without warranty,” “as is basis without warranty,” or 
“as is without warranty/ies of any kind.”  41 percent (152 EULAs) 
specifically stated “no warranty/ies” or “makes/provides no warranty of 
any kind.”  In the fifty EULAs that provided a warranty, the vendor 
guaranteed that the product “will perform substantially in accordance 
with the documentation.”  Almost half (177) of the EULAs, on the other 
hand, explicitly stated that the licensed products were not “error free.” 
66 percent (245 EULAs) limited the liability of the vendor in some 
regard.  In these 245 agreements, the seller confirmed that “in no event 
shall/will [it] be liable” for various categories of damages.  Specific 
disclaimers that appeared frequently included liability disclaimers for 
“loss of data” or “lost data” (145 EULAs), “loss of profits” or “lost 
profits” (197 EULAs), and “interruption of business operations” (76 
EULAs).  The seller’s “entire liability” was often limited by the 
agreement to an amount not exceeding the amount paid for the software 
or services (171 EULAs). 
On the face of these license agreements, then, the commercial user of 
security systems commonly used “as is” software, therefore at risk for 
bearing almost all costs—which, as discussed in the Introduction, can be 
considerable—in the event the software fails and a data breach occurs.  
And given the similarity of the EULAs’ low vocabulary density, one 
could wonder how the buyer even knows what the phrase, “as is,” really 
means.  One would expect contracts or purchase orders for “mass-
market” software, as with coffee pots or other standardized goods, to be 
boilerplate: neither the seller nor the buyer needs additional, contractual 
information to understand the nature of the exchange.  This is also true 
for many services, ranging from lawn care (e.g., the grass will be cut 
when it reaches a certain height and buyer will pay a set fee) to a knee 
replacement (e.g., the natural joint will be removed and replaced and the 
insurance carrier billed for the surgeon’s fee).  But given the complexity 
 
with non-letter characters (e.g., spaces between the words).  Second, we transformed all the 
characters in our documents to lower case.  Third, we filtered entity names (i.e., people, 
organizations, places, etc.) from the documents.  Fourth, we generated n-grams (with n set to 7) 
from the document terms.  An n-gram is essentially a series of consecutive tokens of length n, 
which are used fully to capture the terms of interest, which are “delivered” in the n-gram.  Fifth, 
after creating the n-grams, we filtered the “stopwords” from our corpus.  Stopwords are basically 
words that occur so frequently in text and speech that individually they do not add any specific 
meaning to the document, like “a.”  These may, however, have significance in conjunction with 
other terms, and that is why we created the n-grams first.  The end product of these transformations 
was a term occurrence matrix that listed the total term (words and n-grams) occurrences, as well as 
document occurrences. 
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and variability of a “security system,”117 and of each individual 
company’s hardware, software, network, and business functions, it would 
seem that both the seller and the buyer would need additional, contractual 
language to effectuate a transparent exchange.  Certainly, it is possible to 
employ a simple, formulaic contract for the exchange of complicated 
services.  For example, a law firm retainer agreement is usually simple 
and somewhat “boilerplate.”  But the obligations and responsibilities of 
the attorney to the client need not be spelled out in detail in the contract: 
the applicable code of professional conduct contains a host of 
performance obligations the attorney must follow, and which the client is 
entitled to expect.  The professional standard of care imposes its own set 
of performance requirements.  But no such extracontractual professional 
standards exist in the security software world.118  Caveat emptor appears 
to reign in this market, just as it does in the consumer market. 
Of course, sophisticated commercial purchasers of enterprise security 
software and systems do not necessarily enter into these “boilerplate” 
license agreements.  Some percentage of licensees surely negotiate more 
favorable terms, including more robust warranty provisions.119  But for 
some reason—the disclaimers, limited warranties, limitations on 
recoverable elements of damages, and indefinite contractual description 
of expected performance in the EULAs being possible explanations—the 
software vendors are not being held accountable in the event of a data 
breach.  Repeated searches of reported federal and state cases 
demonstrate a curious dearth of lawsuits by companies120 against security 
 
117. By “complexity,” we mean here the variety in infrastructure configurations.  No two 
corporate clients will have their computing infrastructure set up in the exact same way.  The vendor 
will have tested its software performance in various simulated environments, but it cannot expect 
that the product will perform the exact same way in every environment.  This complexity also 
increases due to the rate by which technologies come and go: customers may have legacy 
applications which are no longer compatible with current standards.  In addition, as discussed 
earlier, new vulnerabilities surface all the time, which often means the vendors need to modify their 
products to accommodate for the new challenges.  In short, security software functions in a 
complicated and dynamic environment. 
118. E.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1590 (“It is theoretically possible that a software 
engineer could be held liable for computer malpractice but, to date, no court has held that a software 
engineer’s failure to develop reasonably secure software constituted professional negligence.”).  
Note that the company buying the software, on the other hand, may be subject to specific, regulatory 
standards for data security.  Dana Rosenfeld & Donnelly McDowell, Moving Target: Protecting 
Against Data Breaches Now and Down the Road, 28 ANTITRUST 90, 90–93 (2014). 
119. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Transp. Sec. Solutions v. MTA Capital Const. Co., No. 09 Civ. 
4077 (PGG), 09 Civ. 6033 (PGG), 2014 WL 12560686, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) 
(explaining that in a contract for the purchase of a $300 million security system for the New York 
metropolitan area transportation system, Lockheed warranted, inter alia, to provide equipment and 
software “fit for the MTA’s intended use” and “free from defects in design, material and 
workmanship”). 
120. Consumers seem somewhat more apt to seek compensation from their security software 
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software and services vendors arising from a data security breach.121  The 
occasional lawsuit between a purchaser and a security software vendor 
involves, instead, a dispute about contractual obligations other than 
securing data.122  One could wonder why companies, collectively 
spending billions of dollars on security software and systems, are not 
fighting back. 
C.  Commercial Licensors: Unable or Unwilling to Hold Vendors 
Accountable? 
Although identifying the many reasons any one company accepts the 
status quo is an impossible task, some common themes can be discerned.  
First, regarding those companies that accept the “boilerplate” terms 
which effectively shield vendors from liability, this contractual allocation 
of risk may, at first blush, seem to be a perfectly reasonable choice for 
the licensee, for it can insure against that risk.123  But because of the 
“unpredictable probability and costs” of data breach, cybersecurity 
insurance is particularly expensive.124  Because if insured, the policy 
premium may not come close to covering the entire loss to the 
 
vendors when that software malfunctions in some way.  See generally Boyd v. Avanquest N. Am. 
Inc., No. 12-cv-04391-WHO, 2015 WL 4396137 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (denying a software 
manufacturer’s motion to dismiss a class action seeking damages from an alleged breach of 
contract); Haskins v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-cv-0183-JST, 2013 WL 6234610 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 
2013) (dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for false representations by a computer security software 
manufacturer); Bilodeau v. McAfee, Inc., No. 12-CV-04589-LHK, 2013 WL 3200658 (N.D. Cal. 
June 24, 2013) (granting the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint against a computer security 
software manufacturer); Rottner v. AVG Technologies USA, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D. Mass. 
2013) (granting a software manufacturer’s motion to dismiss a class action complaint claiming false 
representation); Gross v. Symantec Corp., No. 12-00543 CRB, 2012 WL 3116158 (N.D. Cal. July 
31, 2012) (granting a software manufacturers’ motion to dismiss a class action for fraudulent 
inducement, express warranty, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant). 
121. The few, related cases found include National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Trustwave 
Holdings, Inc., No. CN14C-10-160 MMJ (CCLD), 2016 WL 2354621 (Del. Super. Ct. May 3, 
2016), in which the subrogee sued a qualified security assessor for allegedly failing to ensure 
compliance with standard measures for securing credit card transactions, resulting in a breach, and 
Cotton Patch Café, Inc., v. Micros Systems, No. MJG-09-3242, 2012 WL 5986773 (D. Md. Nov. 
27, 2012), in which the defendant, vendor of Point-of-Sale systems to retailers, allegedly installed 
a server containing malware which hackers used to access data. 
122. See generally i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 
2002) (granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, reasoning that the 
plaintiff could not be awarded specific performance because the software was not irreplaceable); 
Piper Jaffray & Co. v. SunGard Sys. Int’l, Inc., No. 04-2922 (RHK/JSM), 2004 WL 2222322 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 30, 2004) (granting a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims against 
a software manufacturer). 
123. See generally Garrie & Mann, supra note 51, at 385 (arguing that one of the difficulties 
associated with the high costs of cybersecurity insurance is choosing between spending money on 
cybersecurity insurance or investing in cybersecurity technology). 
124. Id. at 384. 
12_RIEDY (1099-1134).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2017  11:10 AM 
1120 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
company.125 
Rather than insure against an uncertain risk, companies could negotiate 
more favorable terms with security vendors, demanding meaningful 
warranties and reallocations of the risk of loss.  These are not, after all, 
individual consumers buying Microsoft operating systems with security 
flaws.126  Presumably, as a consequence, vendors would provide more 
secure software, but this “better” software would come at a higher cost.127  
In the end, however, companies may simply be unwilling to pay this 
higher cost to ensure greater protection.  Although the issue is a matter of 
some debate,128 it would appear most observers believe companies 
underspend on cybersecurity overall.129 
Compounding the issue is the fact that, for any one business, the risk 
of a large-scale data breach and resulting loss is small.130  If a breach 
occurs, some portion of the loss to the company may be recouped through 
insurance coverage.131  If the publicity of the breach causes a drop in the 
company’s share price, that drop may be just temporary.132  The net cost 
of the breach to the company may be a very small percentage of annual 
revenues.133  Therefore, paying more for better security software is just 
not worth the cost for companies.134 
 
125. E.g., Hackett, supra note 52 (reporting information from Target’s financial statements 
showing, for 2014, $191 million in losses caused by a data breach, offset by $46 million in 
insurance receivable). 
126. See generally Kuwahara, supra note 6 (discussing impediments to liability and proposing 
various possible solutions). 
127. Cf., Oriola, supra note 3, at 472 (arguing that the lack of a demand for more secure, and 
presumably more costly, software in the consumer market is due, in part, to the fact that software 
cannot be wholly secure). 
128. Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1510 
(2013). 
129. Id. at 1511 (“Most observers believe that firms are underinvesting—and are missing the 
mark by a wide margin.”). 
130. Verizon’s Report, supra note 16.  Similarly, in 2016, pursuant to IBM’s 2017 Cyber 
Security Intelligence Index Report, more than 54 million “security events” were detected by the 
clients’ systems or networks, whereas the average client experienced only ninety-three attacks out 
of these events.  2017 IBM X-FORCE THREAT INTELLIGENCE INDEX, IMB SECURITY 3 (Mar. 
2017), http://www-03.ibm.com/security/data-breach/cyber-security-index.html.  In other words, 
only a fraction of a percent of the total security events represents a significant level of severity. 
131. Garrie & Mann, supra note 51, at 380–81 (arguing that cybersecurity coverage is needed 
given the high cost of data breach).  Thus, the risk allocation provisions of the EULA’s would be 
acceptable: the buyer accepts the risk of loss and simply insures against it. 
132. Kvochko & Pant, supra note 38 (illustrating the momentary stock declines of Home Depot, 
Sony, Target, and Sears following a publicized data breach). 
133. Hackett, supra note 52 (“From Sony to Target, big companies that were hacked felt barely 
a dent to their bottom line.”). 
134. The valuation exercise may be greatly compounded by the externalities problem: “The fact 
that many costs of cyber-attacks are externalized is enormously significant.”  Sales, supra note 128, 
at 1526. 
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In any event, similar to consumers, those companies bound to the same 
types of vendor-protective licensees are unable to hold software vendors 
accountable.  Contractual limitations on liability are generally 
enforceable, particularly in commercial transactions.135  As with claims 
brought by individuals arising from data breach, tort claims by 
commercial buyers would encounter many, perhaps insurmountable 
problems, including, inter alia, the economic loss rule.136  In many 
jurisdictions, the economic loss rule precludes recovery in tort where the 
injury is pecuniary and no claim exists for physical injury, death, or other 
property damages. 
Even when a data breach occurred and the company that experienced 
the breach is not precluded by contract from seeking damages from a 
security vendor, realistically identifying that vendor as a culpable party 
to the breach is beset with a number of technical and legal difficulties.  
On the technical side, for the company to even investigate whether the 
breach may have implicated a specific software is often a trial-and-error 
game.  Some evidence of what occurred can be collected through digital 
forensics, but only if the attackers have not removed all the traces of their 
activity by, for example, wiping the system event logs.  But even if there 
is clear evidence that the attack came through a specific software 
package, the company itself can usually only examine the binaries of a 
given piece of software because the software is commonly purchased and 
installed in proprietary, closed-source code.  In other words, symptoms 
of a suspected vulnerability may be detectable, but only the vendor can 
identify the root cause because it is hidden behind the code.  In a 
potentially adversarial situation, obtaining the vendor’s helpful 
intervention seems unlikely. 
From the legal point of view, proving “cause in fact” will prove 
difficult because multiple access points to the data are likely137 and 
multiple intervening actions between the coding of the software and the 
breach likely occurred.138  Proximate cause is also a very sticky 
wicket,139 particularly given the difficulty of ascribing foreseeability to 
the consequences of any particular software error.  It might be reasonably 
 
135. E.g., Scott, supra note 70, at 437 (explaining that warranty disclaimers are presumed valid 
and construed strictly in favor of the buyer). 
136. Id. at 481 (“However, for the most common forms of injury caused by defective security 
software—loss of sensitive corporate and third party data—the economic loss rule will continue to 
bar most claims.”). 
137. E.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 252 (arguing that most data disasters have 
occurred because of weak access controls in “the terrestrial world” rather than through hacking in 
cyberspace). 
138. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 96, at 316. 
139. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1602. 
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foreseeable that a breach might occur, given what is widely known about 
cybercrime today,140 but the industry knows very little about what 
cybercriminals do with all the purloined data unless a criminal 
investigation brings it to light in a particular case.141  Thus, defining what 
damages are “reasonably foreseeable” is problematic: “Even if the 
plaintiff establishes actual cause, there may not be recovery if the causal 
relationship between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s losses is 
too remote.”142 
Despite all these hurdles, one would presume that if the lack of data 
security were untenable, sophisticated commercial buyers would take 
action.  Buyers would demand favorable contract terms, notwithstanding 
some price increase, or corporate counsel would have brought viable 
claims in court (e.g., claims of negligent misrepresentation or fraud by 
nondisclosure),143 notwithstanding restrictive contract terms.  
Sophisticated forensic experts would have identified software 
vulnerabilities and opined, in court, that that particular defect was a cause 
of the breach.  Data would be more secure.  But this hypothetical surely 
does not look like the security world today.144 
None of this is happening because, apparently, for any or all of the 
reasons proposed above, the situation is tenable, insofar as business is 
concerned.  Unless some external force propels a change, there is little 
reason to believe the commercial buyers are going to step up to the plate 
and demand better security software.  The consumers whose data those 
companies house are therefore largely left out in the cold.145  It has been 
observed: “The problem is that those responsible for securing our 
personal data are rarely the ones who pay the cost of securing it and in 
 
140. See generally Meiring de Villiers, Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law: 
A Forensic Analysis, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2008) (presenting an analysis of civil 
liability for the failure to safeguard confidential information). 
141. E.g., Shahani, supra note 32 (reporting on a federal indictment naming three men who 
were believed to have hacked JPMorgan Chase). 
142. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 70, at 1602. 
143. Cotton Patch Café, Inc., v. Micros Sys., No. MJG-09-3242, 2012 WL 5986773, at *3 (D. 
Md. Nov. 27, 2012). 
144. Supra Part I (recognizing that software vendors almost universally shield themselves from 
liability in the event of a breach of contract). 
145. But in Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., a class of plaintiffs sued the data security 
vendor whose products and services were used by the South Carolina Department of Revenue after 
a breach of the department’s records resulted in unauthorized access to taxpayer records.  27 F. 
Supp. 3d 871, 872–73 (N.D. Ill. 2014).  The plaintiffs brought claims alleging violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, negligence, and invasion of privacy and contract (third-party beneficiary).  
Id. at 873–74.  The court dismissed the case based on a finding of lack of an actual injury sufficient 
to support standing.  Id. at 877–78.  The court noted, in dicta, that Trustwave, the security software 
vendor, was not a “consumer reporting agency” subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  Id. at 
882.  It is unknown whether any of the other claims would have survived. 
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many cases are not the same people with whom we have entrusted our 
data in the first place.”146  Another problem is that those companies with 
which consumers have entrusted their data (i.e., retailers, hotels, and 
other consumer product and service providers) are not able, or perhaps 
not willing, to ensure those responsible for securing consumer data (i.e., 
security software vendors) actually secure it or to take any responsibility 
after that data is stolen.  But should consumers just concede to this 
situation? 
II.  IT IS UNFAIR NOT TO TELL 
This Article proceeds on the assumption that something should be done 
to alter the prevailing relationship between security software vendors and 
commercial licensees of security software and systems.  Something must 
be done to incentivize the development of better commercial security 
systems, with or without the participation of the companies buying those 
systems, to better protect consumer and client data.  This Article’s 
proposal for accomplishing these objectives relies on a combination of 
required information disclosure from security software vendors and 
penalties based on existing unfair trade laws in the event of 
nondisclosure.  Specifically, this Article proposes that regulators consider 
deeming it an “unfair trade practice” if a commercial security software 
vendor knows or should have known of a vulnerability in its software, but 
does not notify all of its licensees of that known defect. 
Part II.A discusses the weaknesses of the existing, voluntary 
information-sharing programs and the benefits to be gained by disclosing 
cybersecurity information, including software-vulnerability information.  
Part II.B proposes that a required vulnerabilities disclosure fits well 
within existing jurisprudence defining “unfair trade practices” in the 
cybersecurity arena. 
A.  Information Sharing as a Data Security Measure 
Cybersecurity information sharing (“CIS”)147 has its detractors, 
certainly,148 but the prevailing view notes that by sharing information, 
 
146. Mark Rasch, How Much Does a Security Breach Actually Cost?  And Who Pays for It?, 
REG. (July 15, 2005, 6:02 AM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/07/15/who_pays_for_security_breaches. 
147. Cybersecurity information sharing (“CIS”) can be defined as “the collection, analysis, 
distribution, and utilization of any information relevant to a cybersecurity threat.”  Ford, supra note 
67, at 123. 
148. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Sharing Shortcomings, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 468–78 
(2015) (critiquing the current policy focus of CIS on information sharing).  CIS that involves 
sharing information with the government also raises privacy concerns.  For example, the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, a nonprofit think tank that advocates for online civil liberties, opposed 
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companies will be better able to counter a security problem that is 
otherwise, perhaps, virtually intractable.149  In any event, CIS as a tool 
against cyberthreats has firmly arrived on the scene. 
There are many reasons why CIS among data-theft targets is an 
effective deterrent.  Attacks on networked computers continue to increase 
in number and in sophistication.150  Large-scale breaches of corporate 
data are increasingly attributable to an advanced persistent threat 
(“APT”), not some opportunistic “hack.”151  An APT exists when the 
attacker (1) has an above-average expertise to carry out more 
sophisticated exploits, (2) is determined to achieve his or her goal, and 
(3) also has sufficient resources to support his or her actions.  An APT 
family of threats usually identifies targeted attacks that take place over a 
prolonged period of time where the attacker will not give up before 
achieving his or her goal.  In contrast, opportunistic attacks usually result 
from the attacker’s consistent scan of the environment and an impulsive 
attack when the opportunity presents itself.  Historically, APT was a term 
reserved for statewide cyberattacks.  But recently, the industry identifies 
a hack as an APT when the primary goal of the hack is simply to steal 
data.  The technical sophistication of an APT is often enhanced by adding 
social-engineering strategies, like spear phishing, to the mix.152 
By sharing information about the nature and target of past attacks, 
companies may become aware of potential vulnerabilities of which they 
 
the Consumer Information Security Act (“CISA”) on the grounds that the statute would facilitate 
government surveillance and other individual privacy violations. 
149. E.g., Sales, supra note 128, at 1546 (“Effective cyber-security depends on the generation 
and exchange of information.”). 
150. E.g., Ford, supra note 67, at 121 (surveying the incidence and cost of increased networked 
computer targeted attacks); Ariana L. Johnson, Cybersecurity for Financial Institutions: The 
Integral Role of Information Sharing in Cyber Attack Mitigation, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 277, 283 
(2016) (explaining further why financial institutions are particularly vulnerable to attacks). 
151. Advanced persistent threat (“APT”) implies a targeted and systematic attack, whereas an 
“opportunistic” hack is not. 
152. Phishing is a type of social engineering—a high-tech scam that uses e-mail or websites to 
deceive people into disclosing personal information useful in identity theft, such as credit card 
numbers, bank account information, social security numbers, passwords, or other sensitive 
information.  Spear-phishing attacks target a smaller, more select group of individuals (e.g. users 
of a specific website, members of an organization, etc.) with the primary goal of bypassing the 
security perimeter of the target organization.  Spear phishing is different from regular phishing in 
that it uses contextual information relevant to the recipient and spear phishing appears as if it was 
sent from somebody within the organization.  FIREEYE, INC., SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACKS WHY 
THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL AND HOW TO STOP THEM 3 (2016), 
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/fireeye-how-stop-spearphishing.pdf; see generally 
EUROPEAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 
(IOCTA) 2016 REPORT (2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/internet-organised-crime-
threat-assessment-iocta-2016 (identifying spear phishing as a key threat and recommending various 
protocols for future developments in spear phishing). 
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had no prior knowledge; gain understanding of the methods used by the 
hackers (the “tactics, techniques, and procedures” (“TTPs”)); and be 
better able to design effective defenses against those TTPs.153  Detecting 
threats and vulnerabilities and investigating the TTPs is costly and time 
consuming.154  Any one company can afford only so much analysis.  With 
widespread sharing of the results of cybersecurity analysis, every 
company, at a very low cost, can acquire a much more robust inventory 
of threat and vulnerability information than it could ever achieve with its 
own resources.155  The same is true for effective response and mitigation 
actions: the exchange of information about these issues increases the 
speed and accuracy with which companies can react to attacks.156  TTPs 
are constantly evolving, such that effective data security requires constant 
innovation.  Measures that encourage companies to share information 
about perceived and actual security threats, and to cooperate in 
developing new technologies, are likely to improve data security for 
all.157  Accordingly, a wide range of scholars argue that “intelligence 
dissemination” is likely one of the best tools for enabling an effective 
cybersecurity strategy.158 
Many different varieties of CIS are certainly in use today.  Government 
efforts to improve national security, including the security of critical 
industries, drive most of the CIS.  These efforts include, inter alia, the 
provision by government agencies of cyberthreat and vulnerability 
information to industry about cyberthreats and vulnerabilities, and the 
encouragement of information exchange between government and 
private industries.  Thus, for example, the Clinton administration 
encouraged the creation of industry-specific Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers,159 which share threat and mitigation information with 
 
153. Ford, supra note 67, at 123. 
154. Id. at 124. 
155. Id. at 125. 
156. Johnson, supra note 150, at 294. 
157. See S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 2 (2015) (“The [CISA] believes that ‘such increased sharing 
will drive public and private sector cybersecurity efforts to develop key new technologies and 
processes.’”). 
158. See, e.g., Craig et al., supra note 7, at 726 (arguing that an effective proactive cybersecurity 
strategy should focus on real-time detection, attribution of threat actors, flexibility of response 
actions, and intelligence dissemination); Ford, supra note 7, at 131 (noting that attributing 
malicious attacks requires correlation with other intelligence sources); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra 
note 96, at 353 (“The best step policymakers could take immediately would be to encourage 
reporting of security breaches.”); see generally Johnson, supra note 150 (suggesting that utilizing 
cyberintelligence may create better network monitoring and more effective detection and 
mitigation). 
159. E.g., WHITE PAPER: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY ON CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63, at 10 (May 22, 1998), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/paper598.pdf (noting that the creation of information 
12_RIEDY (1099-1134).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2017  11:10 AM 
1126 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
industry partners and with the government.160  Late in 2015, President 
Obama signed the Computer Information Sharing Act, which directs the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and other 
government agencies to provide information to the private sector and 
allows private-sector companies to share “cyberthreat indicators” and 
defensive measures with each other and with the government in exchange 
for immunity from liability from antitrust and other laws.161  Wholly 
private initiatives to promote CIS have also emerged, including, for 
example, the Cyber Threat Alliance, which welcomes “all organizations” 
to share in cybercrime threat intelligence.162 
Information on software vulnerabilities is especially critical in 
improving data security.163  To this end, DHS’ United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team sponsors a national vulnerabilities database 
(“NVD”) (i.e., a compilation of standards-based, or defined 
vulnerabilities, reported voluntarily).164  Though the database currently 
contains almost 80,000 identified vulnerabilities,165 by most accounts the 
list is wholly inadequate.166  The efficacy of the program depends, to a 
large extent, on the willingness of software vendors to disclose 
vulnerabilities, or “bugs,” of which they have become aware, but 
software vendors may be reluctant to publicly disclose vulnerabilities for 
many reasons.167  Disclosure may cause a vendor to lose customers and 
 
sharing and analysis centers in private sector industries is “strongly encouraged”). 
160. About NCI, NAT’L COUNCIL ISACS, http://www.nationalisacs.org/about-nci (last visited 
May 10, 2017). 
161. THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-
FEDERAL ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH 
FEDERAL ENTITIES UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015, at 4 
(2016). 
162. McAfee and Symantec Join Fortinet and Palo Alto Networks as Co-founders of the 
Industry’s First Cyber Threat Alliance, CYBER THREAT ALLIANCE, 
https://cyberthreatalliance.org/pr/mcafee-and-symantic-join-fortinet-and-palo-alto-networks-as-
co-founders.html.  The founding members of Cyber Threat Alliance were Fortinet, McAfee, Palo 
Alto Networks, and Symantec.  Whether, and to what extent, private CIS is discouraged or even 
prohibited by antitrust and other laws is outside the scope of this Article. 
163. Oriola, supra note 3, at 481 (“It is sacrosanct that vulnerabilities detection research is 
invaluable to computer and network security, as it facilitates the discovery and disclosure of latent 
‘zero day’ or new vulnerabilities that could be exploited by unscrupulous hackers if left 
uncorrected.”). 
164. NAT’L VULNERABILITY DATABASE, https://nvd.nist.gov (last updated Mar. 20, 2017). 
165. Current CVSS Score Distribution for All Vulnerabilities, CVE DETAILS, 
http://www.cvedetails.com/ (last visited May 6, 2017). 
166. Other vulnerability databases exist on the market as well.  For example, the open source 
vulnerability database reports over 120,000 vulnerabilities.  The exact number is unknown.  For 
more information, see The Duality of Expertise: Microsoft, OSVBD (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://blog.osvdb.org/ (last visited May 6, 2017) (providing information about security 
vulnerabilities in computerized equipment). 
167. With some exceptions, reported vulnerabilities are disclosed to the public within forty-five 
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potential buyers,168 whether the vulnerability is fixed, or patched.169  
Creating the patch can be expensive, which means there may be a 
disincentive to do so.170  Disclosure may increase the risk that a hacker 
can exploit the code, whether or not the vulnerability is patched.171 
The vendor is certainly not the only candidate who can report a 
vulnerability: users and “independent security researchers” of all types, 
including malicious hackers, also engage in vulnerabilities-detection 
research.172  These individuals or entities may report the vulnerability to 
the NVD, make the information public,173 report to the vendor, or sell the 
information to the highest bidder in the market for software 
vulnerabilities.  Sellers in this market include, for example, brokers who 
legitimately buy and sell information, as well as criminal hackers.  And 
buyers in this market range from software vendors or users (e.g., both 
Facebook and Mozilla have “bounty hunter” programs for vulnerabilities 
detection)174 to government agencies.175  This market raises many 
concerns, not the least of which is the threat of criminal blackmail by a 
hacker in possession of a “zero-day” vulnerability key to the preservation 
of national security.176  For purposes of a user obtaining accurate 
information on software vulnerabilities, the concern is that these black 
markets are inefficient, because they are “unregulated, unstructured, and 
ill-defined.”177 
A number of the problems with existing information exchange 
programs would be solved, or at least alleviated, if the industry strongly 
encouraged—with the threat of an unfair trade practice charge—
commercial security software vendors to report vulnerabilities to their 
 
days after the initial report.  Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST., 
http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm? (last visited May 10, 2017). 
168. Rahul Telang & Sunil Wattal, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Software 
Vulnerability Announcements on Firm Stock Price, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING 544, 548 (Aug. 2007), http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/rtelang/tse.published.pdf. 
169. E.g., Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1063 
(2011) (positing that vendors face reduced reputational or market pressures to improve security 
when vulnerabilities are disclosed). 
170. Id. at 1065. 
171. Id. at 1064. 
172. Id. at 1065. 
173. For example, Google, through its Project Zero, uncovers and reports previously 
undisclosed computer software vulnerabilities.  Chris Evans, Announcing Project Zero, GOOGLE 
ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (July 15, 2014), 
https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.de/2014/07/announcing-project-zero.html. 
174. Bambauer & Day, supra note 169, at 1066. 
175. Id.; see generally Bambauer, supra note 25 (advocating for and proposing governmental 
regulation for known and unknown threats). 
176. Bambauer & Day, supra note 169, at 1062. 
177. Oriola, supra note 3, at 512. 
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licensees.  This threat would reduce the ineffectiveness that stems from 
the “voluntariness” that plagues the NVD and other private information-
exchange programs.178  Although reputational damage may still result 
from disclosure to licensees, this limited disclosure would presumably 
reduce the risk that competitors could use vulnerabilities information to 
the disadvantage of the vendor, or that hackers could exploit the 
vulnerability.  To the extent the vulnerabilities markets include vendors 
and software users, this regularized exchange of information would be a 
practical first step in regulating one corner of the vulnerabilities market, 
surely a beneficial result.179 
B.  Data Security and Unfair Trade Laws 
The FTC is authorized to enforce section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts” 
that affect commerce.180  Between 2002 and 2015, the FTC exerted this 
regulatory authority in sixty enforcement actions against companies that 
“engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices that put consumers’ 
privacy at unreasonable risk.”181  Specifically, in these actions, the FTC 
protects the privacy of consumers’ data.182  Scholars argue about the 
proper administrative tools that the FTC should use (e.g., adjudication as 
opposed to rulemaking),183 but agree that the FTC has a legitimate role 
in improving data privacy.  Indeed, by some measures, the FTC has 
“evolved into the broadest and most powerful data protection agency in 
the United States.”184 
An act may be “unfair or deceptive,” causing the privacy of consumer 
data to be put at unreasonable risk, if, for example, a company fails to 
follow its privacy policies by engaging in the unauthorized collection or 
 
178. E.g., Become a Member, CYBER THREAT ALLIANCE, 
http://cyberthreatalliance.org/membership/ (last visited May 10, 2017) (recruiting a diverse 
membership representative of the cybersecurity industry). 
179. Oriola, supra note 3, at 514 (“[T]here is a good case for discouraging underground markets 
in software vulnerabilities due to their propensity for perpetuating malicious hacking activities.”). 
180. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
181. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2015 PRIVACY AND SECURITY UPDATE 4 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2015/privacy_and_security_data_update_2015-web_0.pdf.  The FTC’s authority in this regard was 
upheld in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.  10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799 
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
182. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2236 (2015). 
183. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 75, at 988 (noting that “the FTC’s current approach is 
arguably the most aggressive use of adjudicatory procedures to develop a substantive area of law 
that any agency has embraced in the modern era of administrative law”). 
184. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 182, at 2236. 
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distribution of data,185 or if a data-security measure fails.  Thus, for 
example, the FTC claimed that Lifelock, Inc., an American identity theft 
protection company, made deceptive claims about its identity theft 
protection services, and investigated Oracle, a computer technology 
company, when the company failed to properly notify consumers of a 
known security risk in software updates.186  Pursuant to FTC guidance, a 
company housing consumer data may engage in an “unfair” trade practice 
if it fails to provide reasonable security measures to protect that data 
against unauthorized disclosure.187 
The FTC Act defines an “unfair” act as one that (1) causes actual or 
likely substantial injury to consumers; (2) consumers cannot reasonably 
avoid; and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or to competition.188  The FTC’s position is that “an injury may be 
sufficiently substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a large number of 
people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”189  The actual 
“act” that is alleged to be unfair, in regard to the security of consumer 
data housed in corporate files, is the failure of the company to take 
“reasonable” security measures.190 
Thus, in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., for example, the agency 
charged that Wyndham, inter alia, “failed to employ commonly-used 
methods to require user IDs and passwords that are difficult for hackers 
to guess’” and “did not require the use of complex passwords for access 
to the Wyndham-branded hotels’ property management systems and 
allowed the use of easily guessed passwords.”191  As charged by the FTC, 
Wyndham’s “unfair acts” resulted in substantial, actual injury: three data 
breaches and the exposure of over 600,000 consumer card numbers, 
causing fraudulent, unreimbursed credit card charges, among other costs 
to the consumers.192 
 
185. Moncada, supra note 77, at 918–19. 
186. Privacy and Security Update, supra note 181, at 4. 
187. Timothy E. Deal, Moving Beyond “Reasonable”: Clarifying the FTC’s Use of Its 
Unfairness Authority in Data Security Enforcement Actions, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2240 
(2016) (noting that complaints frequently allege a defendant’s failure to employ adequate data 
security measures); Privacy and Security Update, supra note 181, at 4. 
188. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
189. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer 
Unfairness Jurisdiction (1980), reprinted in Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1072–88 (1984). 
190. Deal, supra note 187, at 2240. 
191. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 624 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799 
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).  Similar allegations of “failed” or inadequate data security measures were 
made in administrative actions against GMR Transcription Services, Inc., and LabMD, Inc., among 
others.  Privacy and Security Update, supra note 181, at 4. 
192. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 623.  On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected 
Wyndham’s argument that “unfair” required something in addition to the specific statutory 
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Just as a company’s deficient security measures can cause harm to 
hundreds of thousands of consumers, so, too, can vulnerabilities in the 
security software used by that company to protect consumer data.193  
According to one report, only as few as just ten vulnerabilities (among 
thousands known), in a company’s infrastructure led to the theft of 
hundreds of millions of consumer records in 2015.194  When a company’s 
software vulnerability causes a substantial breach and data theft, it seems 
“unfair” if consumers suffer injury and are not subsequently remedied. 
An act can also be “unfair” if it caused “likely substantial injury to 
consumers.”195  What is sufficiently probable to constitute “likely” injury 
is a bit murky, but the FTC Act clearly draws a distinction between 
substantial injury that “has” occurred and an injury that “may” occur.196  
In regard to data security, the FTC has utilized the definition of “unfair” 
to launch an investigation of Verizon arising from its shipment of routers 
with outdated encryption standards, leaving customers “vulnerable to 
hackers.”197  Pursuant to its statutory authority, the FTC could also 
investigate a security-software provider if a vulnerability in its software 
is likely to cause widespread injury to consumers.  Not every software 
vulnerability is of a type or magnitude that poses a “likely” threat of 
substantial harm, but there is data available that the FTC could use to 
evaluate the risk of breach.198 
What, specifically, the software vendor has done that is “unfair” when 
 
elements, but did not otherwise rule on the lower court’s findings regarding the sufficiency of the 
allegations.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 245.  Wyndham also claimed that consumers 
could “reasonably avoid” this harm by demanding that their card issuers rescind the unauthorized 
charges, but the court, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, declined to make what would in effect be 
this ruling as a matter of law.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 625. 
193. Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1024 (“The combination of vulnerabilities and Internet 
exposure means that failures of seemingly invulnerable systems are legion.”). 
194. McCandless, supra note 40; Verizon’s Report, supra note 16. 
195. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
196. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 182, at 2279–80. 
197. Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., FTC, to Dana 
Rosenfeld, Kelley Drye (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/verizon-communications-
inc./141112verizonclosingletter.pdf. 
198. For example, each vulnerability in the national vulnerabilities database is evaluated using 
the common vulnerability scoring system (“CVSS”).  The framework is composed of three 
indicator groups: base (the intrinsic qualities of a vulnerability), temporal (the characteristics of a 
vulnerability that change over time), and environmental (the characteristics of a vulnerability that 
are unique to a user’s environment).  Each vulnerability is scored on a scale from zero to ten based 
on the base metrics, with “ten” being most severe.  The CVSS scores of the ten vulnerabilities 
through which the vast majority of consumer records were stolen in 2015 range between 4.3 and 
7.5, with the majority being in the upper end of the interval.  See also NVD CVSS Support, NVD, 
https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm (last updated Jan. 25, 2017) (providing an open framework for 
communicating the characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities). 
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it licenses insecure software is another issue.  Just as a company is 
generally required to take “reasonable” security measures, a security-
software vendor could be required to license “reasonably secure” 
software.  Pursuant to such a standard, a security-software vendor would 
be subject to FTC action should a substantial risk of harm result if its 
software is not “reasonably secure.”  Defining “reasonable security 
measures” is no simple task, however, and attempting to define 
“reasonably secure software” is probably even more difficult. 
As noted throughout this Article, “[b]ugs happen.”199  But usually, 
security software “fails” because someone intentionally and repeatedly 
tries to make it fail.200  The notion of imposing specific bounds on 
whether that software is somehow “flawed” in such a situation is perhaps 
somewhat attenuated.  Surely, if a windshield has design flaws such that 
the windshield shatters unexpectedly when a driver drives the car down 
the road, the manufacturer should be responsible for the consequences.  
If, however, the windshield shatters only because someone has repeatedly 
hit the glass with a hammer, perhaps the outcome, and the responsible 
party, is not so clear. 
Similarly, the fact that a hacker has selected a particular code to 
infiltrate is largely a matter of chance.201  But once a company identifies 
a vulnerability, all objections related to “chance” fall away.  Software 
with a known and material security vulnerability does not fit within any 
definition of “reasonably secure.”  A software code cannot be made 
completely error free, ex ante, but once a company identifies an error, it 
can, with some expenditure of time and money, patch or remove and 
replace the vulnerable software.  The rules regarding liability should 
reflect the fact that once a company identifies a specific vulnerability, it 
is no longer a random target, and its software no longer falls under any 
definition of “reasonably secure.”202 
Returning to the fundamental question of whether a particular act is 
“unfair,” it should be noted that the definitions of “unfair” and 
“deceptive” overlap.203  There is arguably an element of “deception” 
when a security-software vendor, knowing of a vulnerability, does not 
 
199. Bambauer and Day, supra note 169, at 1060. 
200. Id. at 1061. 
201. E.g., Oriola, supra note 3, at 478 (describing “software penetration testing” used by 
hackers to probe for software vulnerabilities). 
202. For example, if the vulnerabilities detection research industry uncovers and announces a 
vulnerability, unless and until the software vendor takes action to fix it, hackers can take advantage 
of that known defect.  E.g., Bambauer, supra note 25, at 1048 (discussing the markets for “zero-
day” attack information); Oriola, supra note 3, at 482 (noting that disclosure may facilitate attacks 
by hackers “through the knowledge of vulnerabilities they otherwise would not have had”). 
203. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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disclose it to a licensee.  This is not to suggest, however, that under these 
circumstances the vendor has committed a “deceptive” act within the 
meaning of the statute.204  But it seems fair that the vendor should 
disclose a known risk; therefore, the FTC and the applicable laws should 
recognize that if the vendor does not disclose this risk, it has acted 
“unfairly.” 
In addition, or as an alternative to the FTC, state regulators might play 
a role in holding security software vendors accountable for 
vulnerabilities.  These regulators already rely on state statutes, including 
the “little FTC acts”205 of the fifty states and the District of Columbia,206 
to protect consumers’ data security.  For example, the California Attorney 
General regularly investigates companies for engaging in “unfair 
competition” by failing to ensure data privacy or security.207  In 2013, 
after Citibank failed to fix a known software vulnerability, the State of 
California filed a complaint against Citibank in the Superior Court of 
Alameda County and alleged that Citibank violated several laws, 
including the prohibition against “unfair” competition.208  For the reasons 
proposed above in regard to federal law and the FTC, it would seem 
reasonable for the State to have prosecuted the vendor whose security 
software contained the vulnerability exploited in the breach, had that 
vendor known of the vulnerability and not advised Citibank.209 
Consumers may also play a role in holding security software vendors 
accountable for their failure to disclose risky vulnerabilities.210  For 
example, consumers can now bring state consumer-protection claims 
against the companies housing their data after a breach.211  But these 
 
204. A practice is “deceptive” if it is “likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances.”   Moncada, supra note 77, at 917–18.  The consumers whose data is housed in 
company files have no direct relationship with the security software vendor which sold protective 
software to the company. 
205. Ryan P. O’Quinn & Thomas Watterson, Fair is Fair—Reshaping Alaska’s Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 295, 308 (2011). 
206. Id. at 303. 
207. Privacy Enforcement Actions, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-
enforcement-actions (last visited May 10, 2017). 
208. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008). 
209. Whether the definition of “unfair” in California’s statute is or should be precisely the same 
as under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) is a topic outside the scope of this Article.  
See generally Alexander N. Cross, Federalizing “Unfair Business Practice” Claims under 
California’s Unfair Competition Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 489 (2013) (noting inconsistent 
applications of the statutory definition in the California lower courts and arguing that an approach 
that adopts section 5 of the FTC Act’s definition of “unfair business practices” is the best approach). 
210. For the reasons discussed above, limiting liability to these circumstances seems fair and 
reasonable. 
211. Unlike the FTC Act, state consumer protection statutes grant consumers a private right of 
action.  O’Quinn & Watterson, supra note 205, at 303; see, e.g., In re Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 
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cases face formidable obstacles.  For example, courts struggle to 
determine what types of injury caused by data theft confer Article III 
standing on the consumers whose data has been stolen,212 and many class 
action lawsuits falter for this reason alone.213  Other issues regarding 
damages may preclude recovery, such as the “economic loss rule” in 
some states that limits recoverable damages to “ascertainable” or 
“pecuniary” loss.214  Some state consumer-protection laws provide for a 
private right of action only to enforce prior regulatory orders,215 or to 
prohibit class actions entirely.216  These are only examples; the consumer 
protection statutes of the states and the circumstances of each data breach 
case are too varied to enumerate all the issues encountered by plaintiffs 
in these cases.  But just as the law is evolving so that consumers can hold 
companies accountable for failing to protect their data, so, too, might that 
law accommodate “unfair trade practice” claims against the vendors of 
the software that is actually on the front line in terms of protecting the 
data. 
CONCLUSION 
Data breaches have become so common that some consumers may be 
suffering from “data breach fatigue.”217  And it is true that when business 
 
Customer Sec. Data Breach Litig. (MDL 2595), No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 WL 4732630, at *18–
19 (Sept. 12, 2016 N.D. Ala.) (noting how named plaintiffs alleged violations of unfair trade 
practice laws of Florida, Nebraska, Ohio, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Tennessee, 
arising from data breach); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1154, 1157 (D. Minn. 2014) (alleging similar violations); In re Sony Gaming Networks & 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 985 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (bringing claims 
under the California Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Act, and the Consumers Legal 
Remedies Act). 
212. E.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
customers plausibly alleged standing); see also Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 WL 
2066531, at *6 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged 
standing and granting the motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); In re 
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 
2014) (concluding the allegations were sufficient to establish standing).  Whether and to what 
extent future harm is a compensable element of damage for any particular cause of action asserted 
in a lawsuit arising from data breach is a topic beyond the scope of this Article.  For a discussion 
regarding the validity of such harm, see generally Rachel Yoo, An Expected Harm Approach to 
Compensating Consumers for Unauthorized Information Disclosures, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2012). 
213. The list is a long one.  For an example, see generally Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, 27 
F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
214. See, e.g., In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 (stating that the plaintiff’s injuries are 
cognizable under each state’s consumer-protection laws). 
215. Id. at 1163. 
216. Id. 
217. Elise Hu, I Feel Nothing: The Home Depot Hack and Data Breach Fatigue, NPR (Sept. 8, 
2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/03/345539074/i-feel-
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data is breached, the consumers whose data is stolen usually suffer little, 
if any actual out-of-pocket loss from the breach.218  But those losses do 
add up to billions of consumer dollars transferred to the pockets of 
thieves, and potentially very large costs to the breached company.  
Moreover, the “Internet of Things” portends more pervasive and more 
dangerous consequences from data breaches in the future.  Even now, 
when a data breach may have impacted the outcome of a national 
presidential election,219 consumers and consumer protection advocates 
should remain vigilant in the fight against the hackers. 
Given the digitization of the world, and the fact that data can so easily 
be replicated, stored, and transmitted, preventing unauthorized access to 
data is probably an impossible task.  But any known chink in the armor 
protecting that data should surely be repaired.  Security vulnerabilities in 
software are widespread; any software can contain a security 
vulnerability.  But when a company buys and pays for software 
specifically to provide data security—as opposed to operating a computer 
program—the vulnerability seems particularly problematic.  Yet, for 
reasons explored in Part I, the companies purchasing that software appear 
unable or unwilling to hold the seller accountable.  To bolster the front 
line of defense against consumer data theft (i.e., commercial security 
software and systems) federal and state regulators should consider 
holding the vendors of security software accountable for an “unfair trade 
practice” if a known vulnerability in that software is not reported to the 
licensees.  To avoid this threatened action, vendors may well “out” the 
vulnerability on their own, enabling the companies using that software to 
close the door before the thieves arrive. 
 
nothing-the-home-depot-hack-and-data-breach-fatigue (“You’ve certainly read the what-to-do-in-
the-event-of-a-hack stories here, and elsewhere.  How many times have we recommended looking 
at your credit card bills for any weird purchases, or had security experts remind us to change our 
passwords, or use two-factor authentication, or not trust the cloud with our most private images?”). 
218. See generally Riedy & Hanus, supra note 26 (“The theft of personal information causes 
minimal harm to consumers, while the business-the putative defendant-suffers far greater costs 
associated with a breach.”). 
219. Douglas Ernst, Wikileaks Emails Reveal Podesta Urging Clinton Camp to “Dump” 
Emails, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/nov/1/wikileaks-emails-reveal-john-podesta-
urging-hillar/ (reporting on a “new round of WikiLeaks documents released . . . reveal[ing] a March 
2015 exchange between Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman and confidant Cheryl Mills on the 
need to ‘dump’ emails”). 
